Volume 35
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 35,
1930-1931
3-1-1931

Motive As An Essential Element of Crime
Walter Harrision Hitchler

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Walter H. Hitchler, Motive As An Essential Element of Crime, 35 DICK. L. REV. 105 (1931).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol35/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
Volume XXXV

MARCH, 1931

Number 3

Motive As An Essential Element
of Crime
It has been frequently stated, in varying language, by
both writers and judges, that motive is never an essential
element of crime.' It is quite true that some acts are
criminal though prompted by a variety of motives; that an
act may be criminal though prompted by a good motive;
and that an act prompted by a bad motive is not necessarily
criminal.
But the implication of the statements referred to is that
the motive which prompts an act can have no effect upon its
criminal quality; that an act has per se such quality; and,
whether it is criminal or not criminal, it remains criminal
or not criminal through all the vicissitudes of motive and
purpose from which it may spring. An examination of the
correctness of such statements and their implications may
be of interest.
Motive Defined.
Motive is a desire prompting conduct.2 It is a desire
transformed into a practical incentive or excitant to action.
A motive is thus a desire viewed in its relation to a particular action, to the carrying out of which it urges or prompts.'
116 C. J. p. 78; Clark and Marshall on Crimes, p. 76; May's Criminal Law, p. 25; McClain's Criminal Law, p. 92; P. v. Corrigan, 195
N.Y. 1; 87 N. E. 792; S. v. Santino, (Mo.) 186 S. W. 976.
2
Austin's Jurisprudence, p. 160. For other definitions, see S. V.
Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S. W. 316, 20 Ann. Cas. 191; Ball v. C., 125
Ky. 601, 101 S. W. 956.
3Sully, the Human Mind, Vol. 2, p. 196; Arnold, Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence, p. 38.
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Motive Confused With Intent.
Motive is frequently confused with intent.4 As a consequence, it has sometimes been decided that a person had
no criminal intent simply because he was actuated by a
good motive.5 This confusion of thought is admirably illustrated by the following case. A defendant, who was indicted for the statutory crime of gambling, defended on
the ground that, as a member of the city council and, as
such, one of the committee on police, he undertook, under
the direction of the mayor, to secure evidence against certain persons suspected of violating the law relating to
gambling. With this end in view, and for this purpose
only, he visited a suspected room; and there entered a game
of poker with certain persons,, betting a small sum on the
result. It was agreed that his sole object and purpose
in engaging in the game was to disarm suspicion and to
enable him to secure evidence to convict habitual violators
of the law. The court held that he ought not to have been
convicted, saying "There clearly was no crininal intent.
The general proposition is that without a criminal intent
there ought not to be a criminal punishment." But a dissenting judge correctly said: "The misdemeanor prohibited
by law was playing at cards for money. The defendant
did this. He did the thing prohibited by statute, and he
did it purposely, that is, intentionally. It will not do to
say he had not the intention to gamble, for he did gamble,
but said he did so with a view to catching others. That
was merely his motive as distinguished from his intention.
His intention was to do the act prohibited, and his motive
4Stephen, History of Criminal Law, Vol. 2, p. 110. "Intent in its
legal sense is quite different from motive." Baker v. S., 120 Wis.
135, 97 N. W. 566. "Motive must be distinguished from intent.
Motive is the motive power which impels action for a definite result. It is that which stimulates or excites a person to do an act."
P. v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792.
'Stephen, History of Criminal Law, Vol. 2, p. 110. "Motive is the
inducement for doing an act and intent is the resolve to do it." P. v.
Kuhn, 232 Mich. 210, 205 N. W. 188; Jones v. S., 18 Ala. App. 10, 68
So. 690.
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was to catch others. But one's motive, however sincere,
will not excuse his violation of the penal statute."
Malice.
The confusing of motive and intent is facilitated by
the fact that the "slippery" word malice is applied to both,
and the result is a puzzling ambiguity. The statement that
an act was done maliciously may mean either one of two
things. It may mean that the act was done intentionally
or it may mean that the act was done with some wrongful
motive 7 In the definition of arson the term malicious is
equivalent to intentional. One burns a house maliciously
if he burns it intentionally. There is no reference to any
ulterior purpose or motive.8 On the other hand, it has been
held that the term malicious in the definition of malicious
mischief means not only that the injury to the property
must be done intentionally but that it must be prompted
by a bad motive. 9
Motive a Mental State.
The term motive is sometimes sharply differentiated
from intent, and is used to denote the condition of fact desired. 10 Thus instead of saying that the desire to kill is a
man's motive for entering a house, we sometimes say that
the killing constitutes his motive for entering. In strictness, however, a motive is an internal cause of volition. It
is a particular idea with an affective tone attaching to it,
the idea becoming a motive as soon as it solicits the will."
'S. v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206.
7
Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 400.
BThe failure to observe the distinction between intent and motive
has lead to some confusion in the arson cases. Thus it has been held
that one who set fire to a jail in order to escape was not guilty. P v.
Cotteral, 18 Johns. 115. But it has been held correctly that one who
deliberately sets fire to a jail intends to burn it, whether his motive
be self-sacrifice, revenge or escape. Luke v. S., 49 Ala. 30.
RClark
and Marshall on Crimes, p. 521.
10Terry, Anglo-American Law, p. 67.
1
"Motive is a state of mind." Wagman v. Knorr, 69 Colo. 468,

195 Pac. 1034.
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A motive, in the proper sense of the term, i.e., a mental
state, a desire, necessarily precedes the act for which it
furnishes the stimulus. But in order to be governed by a
motive an actor must look beyond his act to its consequences, which are, as we have just stated, sometimes called the motive for his act. It is obvious, however, that
the consequence of an act, consequences which are not and
may never be, cannot afford a motive for an act in any proper sense of the word. The contemplation of the probability of these consequences, and the desire to bring them
about, are properly called a motive, but to speak of the
consequences themselves as a motive is to use a loose and
inaccurate expression. 2
It ought therefore to be clearly understood that motive,
in the correct sense, is the emotion supposed to have lead to
an act, and that the external fact is merely the exciting
cause of this emotion and not identical with the motive itself."3
Motive A Species of Intent.
Motive, as has been stated, is sometimes confused with
intent and sometimes sharply distinguished from it. In
reality, motive is a species of intent. A wrongful act is
seldom desired for its own sake. The wrongdoer has in
view some ulterior object which he desires to attain by
means of it. The evil which he does to another, he does
and desires only for the sake of some resulting good which
he will obtain for himself. He intends the attainment of
this ulterior object no less that he intends the wrongful act
itself. His intent, therefore, is twofold, and is divisible into two distinct portions, which we may distinguish as his
immediate and his ulterior intent. The former relates to the
wrongful act itself; the latter is that which passes beyond
the wrongful act, and relates to the object or series of
objects for the sake of which the act is done. The ulterior
intent is called the motive of the act.
1 2Mercier,

Criminal Responsibility, p. 69.
object which one has in view is sometimes called purpose.
Kessler v. Indianapolis, 157 N. E. (Ind.) 547; 53 A. L. R. 1.
13The
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The immediate intent is that part of the total intent
which is coincident with the wrongful act itself; the ulterior intent is that part of the total intent which lies outside
the boundaries of the wrongful act."4 The wxongdoer's immediate intent is his purpose to commit the act; his ulterior
intent is his purpose in committing it. Every wrongful act
may raise two distinct questions with respect to the intent
of the doer. The first of these is: Did he do the act intentionally? The second is: If he did it intentionally, why
did he do it? The first is an inquiry into his immediate intent; the second is an inquiry into his ulterior intent or motive. Motive may therefore be said to be an intention
to bring about a certain consequence as an end, by means
of other consequences which are also intended but only as
5

means.1

The motive of one wrongful act may be the desire to
commit another. One may make dies with intent to coin
bad money; he may coin the money with intent to utter
it; he may utter the money with intent to defraud. Each
of these acts may be a distinct criminal offense, and the
intention of any one of them is immediate with respect to
the act itself but ulterior with respect to all the acts which
go before it in the series.' 6 The intent to produce an ulterior
consequence, coining, which is not the ultimate consequence
sought, defrauding, is the motive with which a prior consequence, making the die, is produced. And, likewise, the intent to utter is the motive with which the coining is done.
The Irrelevance of Motive.
It may perhaps be stated as a general rule of the substantive criminal law that one's motives are irrelevant.
As a general rule, no act otherwise lawful becomes criminal because done with a bad motive; and, conversely, no
act otherwise criminal is excused or justified because of
the motives of the actor, however good they may be. The
'*Simpson v. S., 59 Ala. 1; Mikell's Cases on Crimes, p. 132; Salmond, Jurisprudence, sec. 134; Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, p. 68.
15Cook, 26 Yale Law Journal, p. 660.
16 Salmond, Jurisprudence, sec. 134.
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law ordinarily judges a man by what he does, not by the
reasons for which he does it."*
A rule which made the existence of a bad motive the
test of the criminality of an act would be popular because
it would tend to bring the law into accord with the popular feeling that the ethical quality of one's act should be
the measure of criminal liability.'8
To such a rule two objections have been raised. In
the first place, it has been said that "the aim of the law is
not to punish sins but to prevent certain external results",1 '
which are considered to be injurious to society, and the injurious consequences of an act are not affected by the motive which prompted it.
It is true that acts are made criminal because of their
consequences; but the consequences of an act, because of
which it is made criminal may be actual or merely anticipated. An act may be made criminal because of its
results or because of its tendencies. Crimes therefore are
of two classes: (1) those in which an act is made criminal
only by reason of some accomplished harm which in fact
ensues from it; (2) those in which an act is made criminal
because of its mischievous tendencies, irrespective of the
actual result.
The mischievous tendency of an act may be due in
whole or in part to the motive which prompts it. The motive of an act may be an index to the probability of certain
future harms which the law desires to prevent. Thus the
object of the law in making burglary a crime is not to prevent the trespasses involved in the breaking and entering,
but to prevent only such breakings and enterings as are
prompted by a desire to commit a felony, and thus become
the first steps to wrongs of greater magnitude, e. g., robbery and murder.
The second objection to making motive the test of the
criminality of an act is the difficulty of ascertaining with
116 C. J. p. 78.

'8 Ames, Essays on Legal History, p. 438.
"OC. v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770.
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precision the motive for any given act. This objection
is of ancient origin. "The thought of man shall not be
tried," said Chief Justice Brian, one of the best of medieval
lawyers, "for the devil himself knoweth not the thought
of man."2 0

An equally eminent English judge has declared

that "secret things belong to God," 21 and the Pennsylvania
court has said that motives are left "to Him who searches
the heart" 22 or to the "Unseen Eye from whom the secrets
23

of no heart can be hidden.

The opinion of the Pennsylvania court 'would be entitled to more weight if it did not place motives in the
"heart". It is true that the Greatest of all lawgivers once
said, "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts," but he was
speaking symbolically. Today we know that motives do
'24
not exist in the "heart."
The difficulties confronting a lay court in a search for
motives is of course more or less serious. But the suggestion that motives are left by the law to "Him who
searches the heart" is puerile. The search for motives is a
frequent phenomenon in the courts, and its difficulty has
not been great enough to deter the law-making authorities
from incorporating into the definitions of crimes motives
as well as physical. acts. In a large majority of cases, a
jury may attain a reasonable certainty concerning the motives of an act, and, in any event, if justice require that the
existence of a particular motive be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try.
Motive As an 'Evidential Fact.
The statement that motive is never an essential element of crime is due in part to the fact that motive as an
evidential fact is confused with motive as an operative fact
or fact in issue. Motive as evidence of another element of
crime is confused with motive which is itself an essential
20y. B. 7 Ed. IV. f. 2, pl. 2.
211

Hale, P. C.429.

22Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 208.
23C. v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507.
24
Lange, Crime and Destiny, p. 7.
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element of crime. The following is a typical statement illustrating this confusion of thought: "A bad motive is not
an essential element of any crime. The existence of a motive is a circumstance to be considered with all the other
evidence by the jury in reaching a conclusion of guilt or
innocence and the lack of proof of it may be a circumstance
to show innocence, but proof of motive is not necessary to
convict, nor is its absence ground for acquittal, for crimes
may be thoroughly established and no motive appear.""
As an ezidential fact motive is always relevant, but
never essential. When a motive of the accused for the
commission of a crime is discovered, it is easier to believe
that he committed it than when no motive is apparent. For
this reason it is alvays relevant to prove the existence of
a motive. 2 But though the discovery of a motive helps to
prove the guilt of the accused, there may be ample proof,
independent of motive, of his guilt. It it not necessary
therefore for the state to prove the motive as an evidential
27
fact.
If we assume that every act must have a motive, i.e.,
a prior conscious, impelling emotion, it is nevertheless always possible that this necessary emotion may be undiscoverable, and the failure to discover it does not signify
its non-existence. The kinds of evidence to prove a fact
vary in probative strength, and the absence of one kind may
be more significant than the absence of another, but the
absence of one kind cannot be fatal. The failure to produce
evidence of some appropriate motive may be a great weakness in the whole body of proof but it is not a fatal one as
a matter of law. In other words, there is no more necessity, in the law of evidence, to discover the particular ex2 5Hughes,

Criminal Law, p. 67. Operative facts are those to
which substantive law annexes legal consequences. Such facts as
tend to prove or disprove the existence of operative facts are called
evidential facts.
26
Trickett, Criminal Law, p. 1026.
27C. v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507. "There can be no escape from punishment for crime when all the elements of it are proved simply because
the motive lies hidden in the heart of the only one who knows it,"

C. V. Danz. Burril, Circumstantial Evidence, p. 314.
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citing emotion, or some possible one, than to use any other
kind of evidential fact.
Motive As an Operative Fact.
To the rule that motive as an operative fact or fact in
issue, as distinguished from an evidential fact, is never an
essential element of crime, there are many and important
exceptions. The criminality of an act frequently depends
upon the motive which prompted it.
The crime of attempt is a conspicuous illustration,
Every attempt is an act done with intent to commit a particular act. The existence of this ulterior intent or motive
is of the essence of the attempt.2 8 The act done may in itself be perfectly innocent and yet be deemed criminal by
reason of the motive with which it is done. To enter a
house and sit on a bed by invitation of the owner is an innocent act, but if it is done with the intention to steal money
which is under the pillow, it is a criminal attempt. 2 9 In
such a case the act derives all of its mischievous tendancy,
and therefore its wrongful nature, from the motive with
which it is done, and a rational system of law cannot avoid
considering the motive as material.
Burglary is another example. It consists in breaking
and entering a dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony therein. The intent to commit a felony,
which is an essential element of the crime, is the motive
for the breaking and entering, and burglary is therefore
"an exception to the ordinary rule of criminal liability,
whereby motive is regarded as immaterial."30 In like manner, the making of a false instrument is forgery, only where
it is prompted by the motive of defrauding.8 1
An intentional homicide may be either lawful or unlawful. If one kills, under proper circumstances, in order
to prevent a felony or to defend oneself, the homicide is
24Clark

p.

402.

and Marshall on Crimes, p. 150; Salmond, Jurisprudence,

v. Tudrick, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 555.
SoStroud, Mens Rea. p. 114.
8
'Clark and Marshall on Crimes, p. 534.
29C.
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lawful. The lawfulness of the killing in these cases depends upon the motive with which it was done, i.e., to prevent a felony or defend oneself. It -follows therefore that
though all the external circumstances exist which would
justify one in killing to prevent a felony or in self defense,
he would be guilty of murder if he killed solely for revenge and not with the motive to prevent the commission
32
of a felony or to save life.
When Motive is Essential.
The definitions of some common law crimes, e. g.,
burglary and forgery, indicate that a particular motive is
an essential element of the crime. This is also true in case
of some statutory crimes where the statutes expressly require that the act shall be done "fraudulently" or "'corruptly," etc.
A particular motive may, however, be an essential element of a statutory crime even though the language of
the statute does not expressly require it. In interpreting
statutes courts have frequently concluded, from the evil
sought to be remedied and other considerations, that it was
the intention of the legistature to make the act criminal
onli if done with a particular motive, even though there
were no words in the statute expressly requiring the existence of such motive. Thus where a statute prohibited,
in general language, the taking of fees contrary to law, the
court held that the taking of such fees was criminal only
when done with a corrupt motive. 33
It is not true, however, as a general rule, that the
courts will require proof of a particular motive when the
language of the statute contains no such requirement. The
cases simply show that in special instances the court
thought it perceived a legislative purpose to require a particular motive as an essential element of the crime. They
82P. v.

Williams, 32 Cal. 280; Wortham v. S., 70 Ga. 336; Lyons

v-. S., 137 Ill. 602. Contra: Golden v. S., 25 Ga. 527. It would, of
course, be difficult to prove that revenge was the motive in such a

case and therefore authorities upon the point are not numerous.
83Cutler v. S., 36 N. J. L. 125.
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do not sustain the proposition that in all cases where a
statute prohibits, in general terms, the doing of an act, the
court will interpolate into such statute the requirement
of a particular motive, merely on the ground that it better
accords with justice.3 4
In some cases the courts have eliminated from the definition of a statutory crime a motive which was expressly required by the language of the statute. Thus where a statute made it a crime to vote "knowingly" and "fraudulently" contrary to law. it was held that one who voted mistakingly believing that under the law he had a right to
vote was guilty. The court held that he was "presumed"
to know the law and that fraud-would be inferred from this
presumed knowledge. "If he was not ignorant of the law,
and that he cannot be heard to allege, then, he voted knowingly, and, by necessary inference, fraudulently." 5
Complex Motives.
A person's motive for doing an act may be complex
rather than simple. The combination of two or more motives in one conative impulse is exceedingly common and
may be said to be the general rule.

6

Many acts which

seem at first sight to have but one motive will be found on
closer inspection to have a number. In cases where a
particular motive is an essential element of crime, the
question may therefore arise whether this motive must be
(1) the sole motive; or (2) the dominant motive, all others
being subordinate or incidental; or (3) a determining motive, i. e., a motive in the absence of which the act would
not have been done, the other motives being insufficient
by themselves; or (4) simply a motive.
It is a question of construction which one of these
meanings is the proper one in a particular case, but, as a
general rule, the motive required to make an act criminal
84

Halstead v. S., 41 N. J. L. 552; Bank v. Piper, (1897) A. C. 383.
85S. v. Boyett, 10 Ired. 336.
86"In the affairs of life, it is seldom a man does any one thing
prompted by one motive alone, to accomplish one end." Bishop,
Criminal Law, p. 201,
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need not be a sole or principal or determining motive.'1
Thus when the defendant was indicted for shooting at B
with intent to do him grievous bodily harm, and the jury
found that he had shot at B to prevent B's arresting him,
but that in order to effect that purpose he had also the intention of doing B grievous bodily harm, it was objected
that as there was a separate statutory crime of shooting
with intent to prevent arrest, and as the jury had found
that to be defendant's principal motive, he could not be convicted of the crime for which he had been indicted. But
the court held that if both motives existed it was immaterial which was the principal and which was the subordinate
8
one.'
Any other rule would be difficult to apply. When one's
motives are of a composite character they are usually mixed to such an extent that it would be difficult for the actor
himself to decide which was a leading or determining motive.
Conditional Motives.
The ulterior intent with which an act is done may be
conditional. An assault is an act of which the actual or
apparent motive is the commission of a battery. The
motive to commit a battery may, however, be conditional.
An act accompanied by a threat of a battery in case a
condition, which the actor has no right to impose, is not
complied with, is an assault. The condition may be that
the victim do something which he is under no obligation
to do or that he refrain from doing something which he has
a legal right to do. It is immaterial whether the victim
does or does not comply with the condition. Thus one was
held guilty of an assault though his act was accompanied
ST"If, moved by more intents than one, a man does what the law
forbids, some of the intents being elements in the crime and
others not, the latter do not vitiate the former, which in their consequences are the same as though they stood alone." Bishop, Criminal
Law, p. 201.
88Rex v. Gillow, 1 Moo. 85.
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with the declaration, "Take off your hat or I will knock
you down," 89 or "Move and I will kill you."'"
The rule is the same if the condition is one performance
of which the defendant has no right to compel by use of
the force threatened. Thus where the defendant drew a
pistol and threatened to shoot if A stopped the defendant's mules, the defendant was held guilty of an assault.
Although A had no right to stop the mules an attempt to
stop them did not justfy the use of a deadly weapon."- But
if the condition is one which the defendant has a right to
impose and compel performance by the force threatened,
an assault is not committed. Thus where the defendant
drew a gun on one who was rushing at him with a knife
.and threatened to kill the rusher if he did riot stop, there
42

was no assault.

Proof of Motive.
A motive which is an essential element of a crime is
never presumed as a matter of law, but must be proved as a
matter of fact equally with the physical part of the crime.
In proving the requisite motive two facts must be established: (1) The mental capacity of the accused to entertain the
motive; (2) its actual formation and concurrence with the
physical act. The capacity of the accused to entertain the
requisite motive is presumed until the contrary appears;
but may be disproved by any evidence which indicates that
at the time of the commission of the physical act his mind,
from any cause whatever, was in such a condition that he
could not have conducted those intellectual operations
which enter into the formation of that particular motive.
The test of this capacity is by no means the same as the test
of general criminal responsibility. A person may be old
enough and sane enough to be criminally responsible for his
external conduct and yet incapable of so estimating ends
and selecting means for their accomplishment as to form a
SOS. v. Myerfield, 61 N. C. 108.
40C. v. Burk, 8 Phila. 612.
"'Hairston v. S., 54 Miss. 689.
' 2 S. v. Blackwell, 9 Ala. 79,
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particular motive which is an essential element of a crime.' s
For example, the fact that a man was drunk does not ordinarily excuse him from criminal responsibility for his acts,
but, if one is accused of burglary, the actual condition of
his mind is open to investigation and if he were too drunk
at the time he did the breaking and entering to put together
the factors of the intellectual problem and correllate them
in a definite purpose to commit a felony, the requisite motive of the crime of burglary is lacking and he is not
guilty.1"
In reference to proof of the formation of the requisite
motive where the capacity to form it is not denied or successfully disputed, the ordinary rules of evidence prevail;
and the existence or non-existence must be inferred from
45
the circumstances.
The requisite motive, or desire, may exist in the mind
of the accused, though for reasons not disclosed to him, the
result desired cannot be accomplished. Thus an assault
with intent to rob may be committed although the victim
has no property in his possession which is the subject of
theft. 6 But of course no sane person can intend a consequence which is in itself and is known by him to be inherently impossible.
Carlisle, Penna.

WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER

4"Robinson, Elementary Law, sec. 471.
"Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 114. Drunken burglars, however, are
quite common types of felons; and Lord Coke's observation, crimen
ebrietas et incendit et delegit, seems to apply with peculiar force
to crimes involving felonious design; so that in practice it is commonly found very difficult to substantiate the plea of drunkenness as
negativing or precluding a burglarious motive.
"5Trickett, Criminal Law, p. 1026; Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof, p. 215.
"Hamilton v. S., 36 Ind. 280.

